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ABSTRACT
Brazilian diplomats and academics alike have long regarded
regional leadership as a springboard to global recognition. Yet
Brazil’s foreign policy has not translated the country’s structural and
instrumental resources into effective regional leadership. Brazil’s
potential followers have not aligned with its main goals, such as a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council and Directorship-Gen-
eral of the World Trade Organization; some have even challenged
its regional influence. Nevertheless, Brazil has been recognized as
an emergent global power. This article analyzes the growing mis-
match between the regional and global performance of Brazilian
foreign policy and shows how both theoretical expectations and
policy planning were “luckily foiled” by unforeseen developments.
It argues that because of regional power rivalries and a relative
paucity of resources, Brazil is likely to consolidate itself as a middle
global power before gaining acceptance as a leader in its region.
All regional powers that aspire to become global protagonists . . . must first be
legitimated at the regional level since they do not possess enough material
capacity or soft power to act autonomously in international politics.
—Maria Regina Soares de Lima, Brazilian IR scholar, Fall 2008
No Governo Lula, a América do Sul será nossa prioridade.
—Celso Amorim, Lula’s foreign minister, January 1, 2003
Brazilian diplomats and academics alike have long regarded regionalleadership as a springboard to global recognition and influence. But
while the strategic goal of becoming a legitimate regional leader has
failed, the ultimate goal of becoming an intermediate world power has
fared better. This article analyzes the growing mismatch between the
regional and global performance of Brazil’s foreign policy in order to
answer two questions. First, what are the causes of this divergence? The
explanation may be structural conditions—e.g., a larger and growing
economy in regard to smaller or laggard neighbors; or policy behavior—
a change in the diagnoses or the perceptions of the Brazilian foreign
policy elite, whose interests or confidence in the region may diminish
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as global opportunities arise. Second, what are the potential conse-
quences of this mismatch? Either Brazil stays the course, reaching out to
the region to bring it together and face the world with a single voice, or
goes it alone.
The first part of this article tackles conceptual issues regarding lead-
ership and power in international relations, setting the context to ana-
lyze Brazil’s emergence as an intermediate global power and ensuing
foreign policy changes. The second part shows that the hardships
imposed by an unruly neighborhood and the preferential treatment con-
ferred by world powers and institutions have led to a shift in Brazil’s ini-
tial strategy, so that the country’s external focus has become increas-
ingly global. Brazil’s regional influence is tested by measuring three
dimensions: performance in region building, regional support for the
country’s extraregional goals, and the existence of contenders for
regional leadership. Global influence is assessed by looking at Brazil’s
participation in top international groups and organizations. A summary
of these findings shows that Brazilian foreign policy has increasingly
combined damage control in the region with mounting global activism.
LEADERSHIP AND EMERGING POWERS
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Both “middle (or intermediate) power” and “regional power” are con-
tested concepts, and attempts at rigorous theorization have led to a dead
end (Hurrell et al. 2000, 1). However, these categories are widely uti-
lized by practitioners and scholars. Following Thomas’s theorem, let us
take stock of their usage and refine their meaning so as to render them
less vague and more analytically useful.1
Jordaan (2003, 165) defines middle powers as “states that are nei-
ther great nor small in terms of international power, capacity, and influ-
ence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability
in the world system.” This definition is as useful a starting point as it is
problematic. It is useful because it provides a basic, structural criterion,
size, on which to build a more precise conceptualization; but it is prob-
lematic because it adds a second criterion, behavior, which is related not
to structure but to agency. 
Should a middle-sized state whose behavior is disruptive rather than
conformist—say, Iran—not be called a middle power? Indeed, Jordaan
excludes from his definition not only Iran but also Mexico, which is at
odds with most of the literature. A further problem stems from his dis-
tinction between emerging and traditional middle powers, as the former
are said to wield regional influence and could thus be called “regional
powers.” But is this a subtype of intermediate power or a different, if
overlapping, category? According to Nolte, the difference between a
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regional and a middle power rests on leadership; hence, a regional
power is a middle power that commands support within its region and
recognition beyond it (Nolte 2007, 11, 15). Although this definition is
static rather than dynamic, it does not seem to differ from Jordaan’s
“emerging middle power.” 
Yet the question remains what a middle power is. Keohane’s classic
answer is that a middle power is “a state whose leaders consider that it
cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact
in a small group or through an international institution” (1969, 295). The
“small group” seems to describe the strategy of emerging middle powers
or regional powers, whereas the reference to an “international institu-
tion” more closely reflects the preferences of traditional middle powers.
Kehoane’s greatest insight, however, is to focus the definition not on the
objective characteristics (of the state) but on the perception (of its lead-
ers). Hurrell et al. later identify this feature as a promising way of res-
cuing the concept through a “constructivist route—to see middle powers
not as a category defined by some set of objective attributes or by objec-
tive geopolitical or geoeconomic circumstances, but rather as a self-
created identity or ideology” (2000, 1).
Middle powership is thus understood as a social category that
depends on recognition by others—peers and smaller states alike.
Unsatisfactory as a definition based on actors’ subjectivity rather than on
objective characteristics may seem, we should remember that the very
definition of which entities can be called states follows a similar logic:
Monaco and San Marino are states not in accordance with the Weberian
conceptualization but because of peer recognition.
As to leadership, it can be defined as the capacity to win and influ-
ence followers. It differs from hegemony: while the latter is better
understood as the capacity of a powerful state (hegemon) to dictate
policies to other states, leadership refers to the capacity to engage sub-
ordinate states so that they adopt the goals of the leading state as their
own. (Paradoxically, this has also been called consensual hegemony;
see Burges 2008.) This brings into focus the other face of leadership: fol-
lowership. The relation between a leader and its followers can be col-
lective—as when the former deals with the latter within a group such as
a regional bloc; or it can be like a hub and spokes—as when the leader
deals with followers individually. Potential followers can adopt three
kinds of responses: bandwagoning, balancing, and resistance (be it foot
dragging or fence sitting). Only bandwagoning nurtures leadership.
Social power, on which the potential to lead is based, is usually
divided into three types: coercive or political, material or economic, and
persuasive or ideological-normative (Etzioni 1975; Poggi 1990). In inter-
national relations, the first two are often paired, giving rise to a twofold
classification: “hard power” is based on the utilization of structural (i.e.
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military or economic) means to influence the behavior or interests of
others; and “soft power” refers to the ability to achieve a nation’s goals
through co-optation and attraction rather than coercion or payment
(Nye 1990). Ideas, institutions, and exemplary behavior are the main
instruments of the latter kind of power. Thus, Higgott (2007, 95) affirms
that “leadership is not the same as economic and military preponder-
ance. Leadership can be intellectual and inspirational as well.”
Context and history deserve attention, because the nature of a
middle power and the significance of regional leadership changed after
the Cold War. In South America, where wars have been rare, power has
perhaps a softer meaning than elsewhere, and policy options may thus
be framed differently. Foreign policy analysis has to take these particu-
lars into consideration and not assume perceptions and motivations
from the general literature. It is also important to test the distinction,
advanced by Jordaan, between traditional and emerging middle powers.
While the former are said to be wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social dem-
ocratic, and not regionally influential, the latter are allegedly poorer,
socially troubled, regionally oriented (my emphasis), and reformist, but
not radical. Although this reductionist scheme does not hold for some
middle powers, it seems to fit Brazil. However, the country’s regional
orientation has not guaranteed successful regional leadership. In con-
trast to conventional accounts, this article makes the case that leading a
region is not a precondition for global emergence.
BETWEEN REGIONAL SETBACKS AND
GLOBAL ACHIEVEMENTS
Brazil’s major foreign policy aspiration has long been to achieve inter-
national recognition in accordance with its self-perception as a “big
country” (Lima and Hirst 2006, 21). This gigantic nation—be it in territo-
rial, population, or economic terms—has been categorized as an emer-
gent power at least since 2001, when a Goldman Sachs report defined it
as a BRIC country—one of the four emerging markets that were forecast
to run the world economy by 2050 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003).2
Brazil, Russia, India, and China, together with the United States, had pre-
viously been called “monster countries” (Kennan 1993). Unlike its com-
panions, however, Brazil scares nobody. On the contrary, it has been
defined as the “quintessential soft power” (Sotero and Armijo 2007, 43;
see also Lima and Hirst 2006; Gratius 2007). 
Having demarcated all its borders at the beginning of the twentieth
century, Brazil neither makes nor receives territorial claims. Brazil’s last
major war was fought in 1865–70, when it aligned with its historical
rival Argentina and tiny Uruguay to defeat Paraguay. It sent troops to
Europe during both world wars but never again engaged in military
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conflicts in its own region. Despite its large armed forces and defense
budget, which is the highest in Latin America, Brazil is not—and has
no intention of becoming—a military power.3 Instead, it sees itself as a
peace-loving, law-abiding, and benign power (Lafer 2001; Ministério da
Defesa 2008). 
These are the characteristics that its leaders have tried to build on
to achieve a preeminent role on the regional and global stage. They
have done this with largely positive—albeit heterogeneous—results.
Brazil lacks the economic leverage to buy its way to regional or global
leadership: although it is the largest Latin American economy, it is not
the richest. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay rank consistently higher in
terms of GDP per capita and human development, and Mexico and
Venezuela do so intermittently, depending on oil prices. This means that
it is virtually impossible to sell to a domestic audience the importance
of large money transfers from Brazil to neighboring countries, as this
would sacrifice poor Brazilians to the benefit of richer foreigners.
Regional Setbacks
The absence of hard power instruments to pursue foreign policy goals
despite Brazil’s relatively rich endowments is aptly characterized by
Sean Burges (2006) as “without sticks or carrots.” Deprived of the struc-
tural resources of leadership, Brazil has had no choice but to resort to
instrumental (or ideational) ones—hence the characterization of the
country as a “soft power” promoting “consensual hegemony” (Burges
2008). But this is only part of the story. If it is true that the quest for
regional influence has been conducted with velvet gloves, Brazil has
deployed tougher—though not military—means to achieve global influ-
ence—replicating, albeit inverted, the regional-global duplicity high-
lighted by Pinheiro (2000, 327). Brazil’s market size, export capacity,
and investment weight have proved effective as bargaining chips in
international negotiations.
As Hakim notes, compared to Mexico, the foreign policy of which
is heavily influenced by and oriented toward a single country, 
The Brazilian approach to foreign relations is very different. Its
diplomats, politicians, and commentators write and speak about
Brazil as a continental power. Pointing to its size and population,
they argue that Brazil should be counted among the world’s giant
countries, alongside the United States, Russia, China, and India.
Indeed, prior to his appointment as foreign minister a year ago,
Celso Lafer argued that the interests of Brazil and these other “mon-
ster countries” . . . go beyond specific issues and outcomes. They
have a major stake—and therefore should have a major say—in
how global affairs are managed. (Hakim 2002, 157)
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Because the country is smaller and less powerful than the other
“monster countries,” Brazil’s ruling elites have believed it necessary to
gain the support of the region in order to bolster their global claims
(Almeida 2007; Hurrell et al. 2000; Lima 2008). This approach is consis-
tent with the conventional argument that “it is the neighboring countries
which have to sign up to the lead of emerging powers . . . in order to
give them the power base necessary for regional as well as global
power projection and international coalition building” (Schirm 2007, 6).
Therefore, in the 1970s, Brazil started a slow but steady warming of rela-
tions with neighbors it had long neglected. The agreements with
Paraguay and Argentina to build the Itaipú and Corpus power plants,
the signing of economic agreements with Argentina that led to the estab-
lishment of MERCOSUR, and Brazil’s prodemocracy activism during the
1990s paved the way for farther-reaching goals. In 2000, these ambitions
crystalized into a new regional concept: South America. By substituting
this for Latin America, Brazil tacitly recognized that it was unable to
exert a significant influence on the whole continent and was thereby
ready to focus on a smaller area, in accordance with two objectives: first,
Mexico—the other Latin American giant and potential rival—was left
out; and second, the countries included in the newly defined region
were less dependent on the United States than those excluded, which
gave Brazil broader room to maneuver. 
To assess Brazil’s performance as a regional and global player, there
are three areas that merit inspection: the operation of Brazilian-led
region-building projects; the degree of regional support for Brazilian
goals within international organizations; and the existence and
prospects of rival contenders for regional leadership.
Collective Leadership: Erratic Attempts at Region Building
MERCOSUR has been a keystone of Brazilian foreign policy since its
inception in the early 1990s. Some years later, however, the government
began to develop a strategy of enlargement to bring into the MERCO-
SUR fold all the other South American countries. In the Brazilian view,
South America is not just a specific geographical region (different from
Latin America as a whole) but also an autonomous political-economic
area, given that U.S. influence recedes as distance from Washington
increases. Brazil’s elites consider this subregion to be within the coun-
try’s natural sphere of influence (Souza 2008; CEBRI-CINDES 2007).
Therefore, the Cardoso administration organized the first summit of
South American presidents in Brasília in September 2000. Lula deepened
this strategy, which led to the creation of the South American Commu-
nity (SAC) at the Cuzco presidential summit of December 2004. The
name was later changed to the Union of South American Nations
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(UNASUR), the constitutive treaty of which was signed in Brasília in May
2008. MERCOSUR arguably constitutes the inner circle of UNASUR.
MERCOSUR was initially a pragmatic integration project that dealt
with trade, customs, and market access, but increasingly it has become
a symbol for progressive political activism and leftist ideologies (Mala-
mud 2005). In Brazil, it has turned into the flagship of those who stand
for developmental, anti-imperialist, or nationalist ideas. To the most
vocal of its supporters, MERCOSUR is not simply an economic associa-
tion or a strategic instrument but a supranational identity that provides
its member countries with the only way to survive in a globalizing world
(Jaguaribe 2001). MERCOSUR’s position as South America’s core was
officially established by the Lula administration, as the inaugural speech
of Celso Amorim, its foreign minister, showed: 
Under the Lula government, South America will be our priority. The
relationship with Argentina is the pillar upon which MERCOSUR is
built. [Without] the Common External Tariff and the Customs Union
. . . any pretension to negotiating together with other countries and
blocs is a mere illusion. . . . We consider [that] it is essential to
deepen integration among the countries of South America. . . . The
process of democratic change that Brazil is undergoing with the
Lula government can be a source of inspiration and stability for the
whole of South America [and] we will not shirk from contributing
to the solution of situations of conflict. . . . A politically stable,
socially just and economically prosperous South America is a goal
that must be pursued not just from a natural sense of solidarity, but
also for the benefit of our progress and well-being. (Amorim 2003,
author’s translation)
Stability, justice, and prosperity of the surrounding states are
referred to as goals that are both altruistic and self-interested. Interna-
tional negotiations without a consolidated customs union are seen as
illusory, and region building as a priority. In short, regional integration
is given precedence over further global action. As even a reputed critic
of the administration admitted, the region was at the center of Lula’s for-
eign policy: “Regional diplomacy, of which integration policy is a part,
is certainly the foreign policy area that most distinguishes the Lula gov-
ernment” (Almeida 2005, 49). Yet results did not measure up to stated
ambitions.
Just as the formula that led to the consolidation of the European
communities involved a combination of liberalization (by France and
others) and compensations (especially by Germany), the underlying for-
mula of MERCOSUR was to obtain “preferential access into the Brazil-
ian market in exchange for Argentine support for Brazilian international
trade strategies” (Bouzas et al. 2002, 145). With the passing of time,
however, mutual understanding between the two countries waned and
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cooperation decreased, giving way to growing suspicion. The imple-
mentation problems that emerged as a result were dealt with increas-
ingly through unilateral measures, and “flexibility and a case-by-case
focus [replaced] the enforcement of rules and established procedures”
(Bouzas et al. 2002, 146).
Enlargement and institutionalization faced the same obstacles that
plagued deepening. In 2006, a protocol was signed with Venezuela to
grant it accession, but it has yet to be ratified by Paraguay. Similarly,
several institutions have been created, but their autonomy and effec-
tiveness remain dubious. The launching of the Initiative for the Integra-
tion of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA) in 2000 and the
creation of a Committee of Permanent Representatives in 2003, a per-
manent Court of Appeals in 2004, a Fund for MERCOSUR Structural
Convergence (FOCEM) in 2005, and a common parliament in 2006 have
not only had little impact but have actually served to disguise the sig-
nificant shortcomings of the bloc, among them the absence of a regional
budget and an agency that can represent common interests. 
All this is not necessarily a drawback for Brazilian interests.
Indeed, some observers argue that Brazil’s interests are best served by
not relinquishing any sovereignty to regional bodies. But it certainly
deals a blow to Brazil’s leadership, as the undertaking it officially
values most is far from thriving. The perception that MERCOSUR is
becoming a burden rather than an asset has led some politicians,
among them two-time presidential candidate José Serra, to call for the
common market to be downgraded to a free trade zone. The argument
is that Brazil will be more capable of pursuing its foreign goals on its
own rather than depending on costly agreements with unpredictable
partners (O Globo 2010).
UNASUR aims to unite two existing regional free trade blocs, MER-
COSUR and the Andean Community, as well as to integrate Chile,
Guyana, and Surinam. The scheme was originally devised to serve
Brazil’s goal of redefining its area of influence as South America. How-
ever, it was later hijacked by President Hugo Chávez and has become a
Venezuelan rather than a Brazilian instrument. The cities chosen to host
the future institutions of this bloc, Cuzco and Cochabamba, reflect iden-
tity claims rather than functional concerns and pay lip service to the
autochthonous discourse of Chávez and his regional allies, whose
understanding of the organization differs considerably from Brazil’s. In
sum, neither MERCOSUR—because of its malfunctioning—nor
UNASUR—because of ideology and rivalry—has turned out to be a solid
springboard for Brazilian leadership. Instead, MERCOSUR has stagnated,
and UNASUR has yet to become more than a “photo-op” forum in which
the Bolivarian impetus is at least as significant as Brazil’s more prag-
matic influence.
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The conditions that may foster or limit regional integration
processes depend on demand (derived from potential common gains),
supply (i.e., leadership), and inertial (i.e., institutional) conditions (Mattli
1999; Malamud and Castro 2007). Inertial conditions are demand or
supply conditions that become institutionalized, locking in previous
agreements and creating path-dependent effects. In South America, a
low level of all these explains not only regional underperformance but
also the free-riding behavior of prospective leaders and followers alike
(Burges 2005, 2006).
Lack of Regional Support for Brazil’s Global Goals
Brazil has long aspired to a permanent seat on the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. In 2004, a high-level committee submitted to the UN Secre-
tary-General a proposal that called for the establishment of new perma-
nent members. Four countries—Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, the
so-called G-4—promptly joined efforts to grab the new seats. 
Many countries in the world have expressed support for some but
not others in this group. But a larger group formed to oppose the cre-
ation of any new permanent seats and proposed the introduction of
semipermanent membership. This assemblage, which was initially
called the Coffee Group and later renamed Uniting for Consensus,
brings together the G-4’s regional rivals. Argentina and Mexico were
among its leaders, together with Italy, South Korea, and Pakistan. As it
turned out, aspiring UNSC members could not persuade their home
regions to support their bids for international recognition (Arraes 2006,
27–40). Though not a surprise, the position of Argentina, Brazil’s main
regional partner, as the staunchest opponent of its main international
ambition dealt a heavy blow to Brazil’s image as a regional leader.
Also under the Lula administration, Brazil put forward a candidate
for the post of director-general of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Early in 2005, there were four contenders: one from the European
Union (Pascal Lamy), another from Mauritius, and rather embarrassingly,
a third from Uruguay, as well as the Brazilian candidate, Luíz Felipe de
Seixas Corrêa. This showed not only that MERCOSUR was unable to
agree to a joint candidate but also that Brazil could not even gather
majority support for its position (as Argentina supported the Uruguayan
candidate). To add insult to injury, the Brazilian nominee was elimi-
nated in the first round, while the Uruguayan, Carlos Pérez del Castillo,
made it to the last. This internal quarrel did not damage Brazil’s repu-
tation and influence in the WTO, but it showed that the prospects for
building a regional consensus to support its global goals were bleak.
Just a couple of months later, Brazil suffered another blow to its
aspirations to rally the region behind a nominee for a top international
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post. In July 2005, two candidates ran for the presidency of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB): Colombia’s ambassador to the
United States, Luis Alberto Moreno, and Brazilian former planning min-
ister João Sayad. Analysts expected the election to be a divisive and dif-
ficult one, with the United States and Mexico backing Moreno and much
of South America rallying behind Brazil’s candidate. However, Moreno
won the support of a majority of Central American and Caribbean coun-
tries, which ensured his quick victory. The election, held behind closed
doors at the IDB’s Washington headquarters, lasted about two hours and
delivered a sound defeat to Brazilian diplomacy, not least because the
winning rival was also South American.
In contrast to that episode, Brazil did gain regional support for its
goal of heading the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Offi-
cially, the Brazilian authorities linked the country’s presence in Haiti
with the aim of obtaining a permanent seat on the Security Council, or
at least having a bigger say in the United Nations (Gauthier and John de
Sousa 2006). Although Brazil’s real motives were more complex, most
did relate to its international ambitions.
Brazil acted in Haiti in response to several motivations. As UNSC
nonpermanent members, Brazil and Chile worked side by side for
the approval and renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate in 2004. . . .
Brazil also sought to diminish CARICOM’s, Venezuela’s and
Mexico’s opposition to MINUSTAH. For Brazilian foreign policy dis-
course, presence in Haiti meant to replace old times noninterven-
tion policy for present non-indifference policy (Hirst 2007, 7).
Thus Brazil exhibited leadership attributes by signaling the adop-
tion of a new foreign policy to its neighbors, working together with its
main partners in South America, showing its capacity to project power
abroad, and demonstrating that it could legitimate a military interven-
tion in the eyes of other countries in the region. And although these
actions were initially controversial at home, this strategy worked.
Regardless of the results of the mission in Haiti, there Brazil was effec-
tively recognized as a regional leader. But this was hardly enough to
cement its higher ambitions; worse, the 2010 earthquake devastated
not only Haiti but also the one thing Brazil had succeeded at in Latin
America.
Hub-and-Spokes Leadership: Prospective Followers 
and Power Contenders
There are two countries in Latin America that are in a structural position
to dispute Brazilian claims to leadership: Argentina and Mexico. Both
have sizable economies, large territorial landmass and population, rich
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natural resource endowments, and a record of intermittent international
activism. Moreover, both relentlessly pursue the diplomatic goal of
impeding any single country from “representing” the whole region.
Their leading role in the Uniting for Consensus group and their partici-
pation with Brazil in the G-20 (the only Latin American countries in the
forum) testify to their international standing as well as their determina-
tion not to be left behind by their bigger neighbor. 
One of Brazil’s responses to this competition has been to exclude
Mexico from its redefined region. In his inauguration speech, Foreign
Minister Amorim listed Mexico after South America, the United States,
and the European Union, together with other so-called “large develop-
ing countries,” such as China, Russia, India, and South Africa. It would
appear, then, that to the Itamaraty, Mexico can no longer be considered
a regional rival: it belongs to another region.
It is not so easy for Brazil to similarly dispatch Argentina, officially
recognized as its main regional partner. For Argentina, however, this
partnership is based on equality of standing rather than on Brazilian
supremacy. Indeed, Argentine leaders have even considered their coun-
try as a legitimate contender for regional leadership, and have promoted
closeness with the United States or other circumstantial allies (Venezuela
most recently) in order to counterbalance Brazil’s power (Russell and
Tokatlian 2003).
Argentine ambivalence toward its neighbor wanes when times are
good and waxes during times of economic hardship, independently of
which party is in government. In the 1990s, Peronist president Carlos
Menem was one of the founders of MERCOSUR, but simultaneously
aligned Argentina with U.S. foreign policy. Likewise, in the 2000s, Per-
onist presidents Néstor and Cristina Kirchner cultivated excellent rela-
tions with the Lula administration but also struck a close alliance with
Venezuelan president Chávez. Argentina has political ambitions similar
to Brazil’s, and it has nurtured recurring economic grievances against
Brazil, which have given rise to spasms of protectionist behavior and
have hindered further integration. As long as these competing aspira-
tions and neighborly fears persist, trying to win Argentine support for
Brazilian leadership is tantamount to “sleeping with the enemy.”
As regards Venezuela, the official line is that Brazil is “not compet-
ing for the leadership of South America. . . . [However, it is] engaged in
a contest for leadership . . . each offering a different vision of how the
regional geopolitical, geo-economic, and ideological space should be
organized and directed” (Burges 2007, 1343). This contest for leadership
is neither structurally nor historically determined, as Venezuela has
never been one of the “big” Latin American countries. Indeed, it has
promoted divergent strategic goals, and its policies are based on the uti-
lization of oil wealth as a means to build political alliances.4
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In spite of this weak power base, Chávez has developed a high-pro-
file foreign policy, which is based largely on vilifying the United States
in much the same way that the Iranian ayatollahs did (Chávez called
George W. Bush “the devil” in a famous U.N. speech). Furthermore, fol-
lowing the principle that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend,” Chávez has
toured the world several times to meet with the leaders of such revi-
sionist countries as Russia, Belarus, Syria, Libya, and Iran—not to men-
tion Cuba, which Chávez holds up as a model. 
All these dubious alliances notwithstanding, the main challenge to
Brazilian leadership posed by Venezuela is not global but regional.
Chávez has courted and “bought” the loyalty of countries purportedly in
the Brazilian sphere of influence, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, and he
even tried his luck with Paraguay. Venezuela’s capacity to win some
regional support with a stance that diverges from Brazil’s has challenged
Brazilian leadership. In the long run, an oil-based foreign policy is lim-
ited by the vagaries of international prices; but in the short term, Brazil’s
ability to control its neighbors has been seriously impaired.
As for Paraguay, traditionally this country has sought to maintain a
balance in its relations with its two giant neighbors, Brazil and Argentina.
Over the years, however, it has also kept close ties with the United States.
Recently, these have included permitting U.S. troops to engage in mili-
tary maneuvers on Paraguayan soil and the opening of an FBI office at
the U.S. embassy in Asunción. Reports say that 46 U.S. military opera-
tions have been conducted in Paraguay since 2002, including visits, spe-
cial exercises, and humanitarian missions, especially in the areas close to
Ciudad del Este, in the triborder region (Inter Press Service 2005). 
In response to this development, Brazilian troops have staged fre-
quent exercises along the border, sometimes crossing the frontier and
provoking Paraguayan protests. The administration of Fernando Lugo
(2008– ) has questioned the current distribution of benefits and energy
generated by the Itaipú Dam, and this has further embittered relations;
a mutually satisfactory agreement has not been easy to strike. An addi-
tional headache for Brazilian diplomacy is that Paraguay is one of the
23 countries in the world (and the only one in South America) that
maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than with the People’s
Republic of China. Since 1957, Taiwan has become Paraguay’s main
international donor, offering cash to finance agricultural, educational,
and social projects and paying entirely for the construction of a new
house of parliament. The unintended consequence of this bizarre rela-
tionship—one that hurts Brazilian aspirations to establish closer rela-
tions with a key global power—is that it prevents MERCOSUR from sign-
ing international treaties with China.
Uruguay, the smallest member of MERCOSUR, nurtures resentment
toward Brazil for two reasons. The first is MERCOSUR’s low perform-
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ance and its bias against the smaller economies, compounded by the
straitjacket it imposes by denying member states the possibility of indi-
vidually signing trade agreements with third countries (Vaillant 2007).
The second is Brazil’s refusal to intervene in Uruguay’s border conflict
with Argentina over the building of a pulp mill. This conflict led a group
of citizens from the Argentine city of Gualeguaychú to block one of the
three bridges that unite the two countries by land. The blockade was in
place from April 2005 to June 2010, in violation not only of Argentine
laws but also of the MERCOSUR treaties. However, Brazilian authorities
argued that this was a bilateral issue and stuck to a hands-off policy.
Sergio Abreu, an Uruguayan leader and one of the first negotiators of
MERCOSUR, contended in a parliamentary speech that Brazil had a
responsibility. 
In this regard, it is not just Argentina that does not meet its com-
mitments but also Brazil, which forgets its responsibility within
MERCOSUR and distances itself from the basic principles inherited
from the Baron of Rio Branco; namely, prioritizing its relations with
the River Plate and adequately managing its interests with the
United States. . . . With the delusions of grandeur that Brazil
indulges in under the current Foreign Minister, membership on the
Security Council and the Group of Seven and leading the World
Trade Organization are its priorities. (Abreu 2006)
In spite of Uruguay’s hints that it would sign a free trade agreement
with the United States, the U.S. administration decided not to intervene
in a way that could damage Brazil’s reputation or leadership. However,
it agreed to sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA),
which crowned the Uruguayan decision to leave the door open for a
Chilean-style policy of international insertion through multiple bilateral
agreements rather than through exclusive membership in a regional
bloc. The United States has also become the main destination for
Uruguayan exports, which further highlights the deterioration of
Uruguay’s trade links with both of its large neighbors.
Bolivia has posed one of the toughest challenges to Lula’s “strategy
of patience” and to Brazil’s policy of foreign investment and energy inte-
gration. The dependence of São Paulo’s giant industrial complex on
Bolivian gas adds stress to a relationship already complicated by blurry
territorial borders. The sudden decision in 2006 by the recently inaugu-
rated president, Evo Morales, to send troops to guard dozens of plants,
refineries, and pipelines and to give foreign companies—including, con-
spicuously, Brazil’s Petrobras—six months to renegotiate their contracts
or get out, signaled the new combative stance his administration would
pursue with regard to foreign investors. What is worse, it underscored
a growing affinity with Venezuelan president Chávez, who had already
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cracked down on foreign firms and allegedly had offered technical assis-
tance to help Bolivia manage its nationalized companies. 
Lula called an emergency cabinet meeting, and Petrobras, whose
investment in the decade since Bolivia privatized its energy sector had
helped that country to quadruple its gas reserves, called the measure
“unfriendly” and threatened not to make new investments. Opposition
leaders cried that Brazil had been humiliated and asked the president to
toughen his stance, which Lula refrained from doing. Instead, he stated
that the Bolivian government had made a sovereign decision and
pledged that his country would respect it. However, the event made it
clear that Bolivia was no longer a reliable partner or energy source.
Since then, the Brazilian government has accelerated its goal of reach-
ing energy self-sufficiency at the earliest possible date.
Brazilian relations with Ecuador have also turned sour on occasion. In
September 2008, President Rafael Correa expelled the managers of Ode-
brecht, a Brazilian engineering company, which he accused of bribery and
of constructing a flawed power plant. Not only did Correa declare that his
country would not compensate the company for what it had already built,
but he also refused to repay the US$243 million loan that Brazil’s national
development bank, the BNDES, had lent Ecuador for that purpose. The
fact that Ecuador had also defaulted on some of its bonds that same month
did not make the Brazilian government any happier. The decision led
Brazil to recall its ambassador, an unprecedented measure. 
There was much speculation about why Correa would have antag-
onized a friendly power, an action that also risked Ecuador’s access to
foreign credit. Analysts referred to the poor state of Ecuador’s public
finances and to rumors that Correa had opted to act preemptively
because of the imminent disclosure that Odebrecht had funded his elec-
toral campaign. Whatever the reason, this crisis shook the foundations
of the ALADI trading system (the Latin American Integration Associa-
tion) and made the Brazilian authorities realize that, for some neighbors,
it was Brazil rather than the United States that was the new “imperialist”
power. In December 2008, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim declared that
his government would revise its policy of granting loans to any South
American partners that contested their debts, adding threateningly,
I hope that all those countries have many other sources of credit
and foreign earnings to continue to make progress. . . . They cannot
continue to treat Brazil like a colonial power that wants to exploit
them. We follow the rules of the international market and if they
don’t think those rules are good, they can start a discussion.
(Amorim 2008)
Lula’s top foreign adviser, Marco Aurélio Garcia, a usually concilia-
tory and soft-spoken envoy to the region, did not mince his words either.
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What I observe is that the Ecuadorian government committed a very
serious mistake. It does not seem to us that this is up to the stan-
dard of relations between Brazil and Ecuador. . . . If a friendly gov-
ernment treats us this way, what should we expect from our ene-
mies? (Garcia 2008)
In the end, Ecuador agreed to disburse the next due payment, and
Brazil reinstated its ambassador. Nevertheless, the affair emphasized that
Brazilian money may well be welcome but is insufficient to buy con-
sent. On the contrary, it can generate resentment. To many civil society
organizations and social movements,
Brazilian protagonism . . . is interpreted politically as an expression
of economic expansionism, above all when the involvement of the
National Bank of Economic and Social Development and . . . the
performance of the large civil construction companies and Petro-
bras are at stake. (Vaz 2007, 34)
In contrast with the cases described above, Peru and Colombia have
turned out to be friendlier partners for Brazilian interests than might
have been expected. But Brazil is not as significant for these countries,
which are also courting an extraregional heavyweight, the United States.
For Colombia in particular, the partnership with the United States is cru-
cial to its hopes of winning back large parts of the national territory that
have fallen into the hands of guerrilla forces and drug gangs. Although
the United States is not very vital a partner for Peru, the latter has culti-
vated increased commercial relations with Asia—mainly China and
Japan—rather than with Brazil.
Chile, last but not least, is as reliable a partner as Brazil can hope
to find in the region. Alas, though, Chile is as reliable in its relations
with Brazil as it is in its relations with everyone else, since the country
has sought to carve out for itself a position as a respectable global
player by abiding by international law and contracts. Although both
countries have participated in the MINUSTAH since 2004, and although
their economic and diplomatic relations are excellent, Chile’s global
rather than regional orientation—and its lack of territorial borders with
Brazil—has limited the potential for cooperation.
South America thus has countries that are either ambivalent about
Brazil—seeing it as a mix between a welcome paymaster and a new
colonial power—or have only minor shared interests, or both. What is
worse, there are a handful of rivals for leadership, either consciously
(Venezuela or Argentina) or less consciously (the United States and even
Taiwan).
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Brazil’s Global Achievements
Brazil’s most resounding international disappointment has been its fail-
ure to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
This long-nurtured ambition was positively fed in 2005, when then–U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a consensus to expand the
council from 15 to 24 members. A report presented by a committee of
experts that year put forward two alternatives to implement this reform
(United Nations 2005). One proposed the appointment of 6 new per-
manent members, and the other called for the creation of a new class
of members, with 8 countries serving for four years, subject to renewal.
Neither plan was put into practice, but these blueprints provoked broad
contestation and led to the formation of the Uniting for Consensus
group, which preferred no change to reforms that might favor rival
neighbors. Because it was clear that this was a core Brazilian foreign
policy goal, this lack of support was seen as a fiasco. But this is an
exception, as Brazilian global foreign policy has experienced many
more successes than failures. 
Perhaps one of the factors that most boosted Brazil’s foreign repu-
tation was its sudden promotion as a BRIC country (Armijo 2007). A
report by the investment firm Goldman Sachs predicted that the com-
bined economies of these countries would eclipse those of the current
richest countries of the world by 2050 because of their rapid growth
rates (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003). The report did not advocate
the creation of a BRIC economic bloc, but there are mounting indica-
tions that the four BRIC countries have sought to form a “political club”
and thereby convert their growing economic power into greater geopo-
litical stature. Notably, the presidents and foreign ministers of the BRIC
countries held exclusive meetings on the sidelines of a variety of forums
during 2008 and started to convene exclusive annual meetings in 2009.
IBSA is a more limited and “principle-oriented” grouping. This
acronym refers to the trilateral developmental initiative between India,
Brazil, and South Africa to promote South-South cooperation and
exchange (Vizentini 2006, 178–89). Following discussions between top
IBSA government officials at the G-8 meeting that took place in Evian
in 2003, the three foreign ministers met in Brasília on June 6, 2003. At
this meeting, the IBSA Dialogue Forum was officially launched with the
adoption of the Brasília Declaration. This group has been publicized not
only as a South-South initiative but as one that brings together the
largest democracies on every continent of the Southern Hemisphere
(Saraiva 2007). It therefore conveys more powerfully than the BRIC the
Brazilian foreign policy banners, such as democracy, respect for human
rights, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Indeed, its main strate-
gic goal has been aptly defined as soft (Flemes 2007).
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Brazil has been most skillful in the realm of commercial negotia-
tions. Although the current WTO round has stagnated, a new collective
actor has emerged from it: the Group of 20 (G-20). Variously called the
G-21, G-22, or G-20+, this is a bloc of 20-odd developing nations that
came together at the fifth ministerial WTO conference in Cancún,
Mexico in 2003. It collectively represents 60 percent of the world’s pop-
ulation, 70 percent of its farmers, and 26 percent of world’s agricultural
exports. Its origins date back to June 2003, when the IBSA foreign min-
isters signed the Brasília Declaration, which stated that the developed
countries were acting to protect their less competitive sectors and
emphasized that their goal was to promote the reversal of such protec-
tionist policies and trade-distorting practices. In the document, the “Min-
isters of India and South Africa thanked the Brazilian Minister for con-
vening this first trilateral meeting,” which made clear that Brazil was not
a minor partner but a leading force in the group (Vizentini 2006,
169–77). This became even clearer in 2008, when the Doha Round,
albeit unsuccessful, came to a close with febrile negotiations between
four actors: the United States, the European Union, India, and Brazil.
This dynamic was reiterated at the Copenhagen Summit on Climate
Change in December 2009, at which the leaders of China, India, Brazil,
and South Africa negotiated the final declaration with U.S. president
Barack Obama, excluding the European Union, Russia, Japan, and other
global powers.
Probably the most select international club after the UNSC, the
Group of Eight (G-8) has been the most influential when it comes to the
global economy. It is a forum for eight nations of the northern hemi-
sphere: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United King-
dom, and the United States, plus the European Union. The G-8 organ-
izes annual summit meetings of its heads of government, and various
ministers also meet throughout the year. In the last decade, some mem-
bers expressed a desire to expand the group to include five developing
countries, referred to as the Outreach Five (O-5) or the Plus Five: Brazil,
China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. These countries had participated
as guests in previous meetings—the so-called G-8+5. The latter were
institutionalized in 2005, when then–Prime Minister Tony Blair, as the
host of the G-8 summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, invited the leading
emerging economies to join the talks. The hope was that this would
consolidate a stronger and more representative group that would re-
energize the trade talks at Doha and promote deeper cooperation on cli-
mate change; hence Brazil became a permanent member of yet another
world-class international organization. It is also a member of the “other”
G-20 (more formally, the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Cen-
tral Bank Governors), a group of 19 of the world’s largest national
economies plus the European Union. This group also met twice at the
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heads of government level in November 2008 and March 2009 in the
wake of the world financial crisis. In the former event, Brazil played a
high-profile role as it hosted the preparatory meeting.
A last conspicuous sign of international recognition of Brazil as an
emerging power and regional representative was the European Union’s
2007 invitation for a “strategic partnership.” This is notable because the
EU had been reluctant to engage other Latin American countries—espe-
cially those of MERCOSUR—individually. The EU’s strategy was to
increase the legitimacy of its integration model by fostering similar proj-
ects beyond its borders through bloc-to-bloc interregional negotiations.
Singling out one country constituted recognition of Brazil’s rising star as
much as acknowledgment of the futility of previous European illusions
about the future of Latin American regionalism.
Over the last years, Brazil has become an increasingly significant
global player and emerged as a key interlocutor for the EU. How-
ever, until recently EU-Brazil dialogue has not been sufficiently
exploited and carried out mainly through EU-MERCOSUR dialogue.
Brazil will be the last “BRICS” to meet the EU in a Summit. The time
has come to look at Brazil as a strategic partner as well as a major
Latin American economic actor and regional leader. . . . Its emerg-
ing economic and political role brings new responsibilities for
Brazil as a global leader. The proposed strategic partnership
between Brazil and EU should help Brazil in exercising positive
leadership globally and regionally. . . . Over the last few years Brazil
has emerged as a champion of the developing world in the UN and
at the WTO. . . . A quasi-continent in its own right, Brazil’s demo-
graphic weight and economic development make it a natural leader
in South America and a key player in Latin America. Brazil is now
actively pursuing this role in the MERCOSUR framework and is at
the forefront of the drive to promote the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR). . . . Positive leadership of Brazil could move
forward MERCOSUR negotiations (European Commission 2007, 1).
Although the EU did not intend to harm MERCOSUR or its relations
with that group, its pompous rhetoric had negative repercussions. By
calling Brazil a “regional” and “global” leader, a “champion of the devel-
oping world,” a “quasi-continent in its own right,” and “a natural leader
in South America,” it damaged its own position and that of Brazil regard-
ing the other South American countries (Saraiva 2009). Once again,
global success has proven to be antithetical to regional leadership.
CONCLUSIONS
In spite of its regional preeminence, Brazil has been unable to translate
its structural and instrumental resources into effective leadership. Its
potential followers have not aligned with Brazil’s main foreign policy
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goals, such as its pursuit of a permanent seat on the UNSC, of the WTO
Directorship-General, or of the IDB presidency, and some have even
challenged its regional influence. By playing the regional card to
achieve global aims, Brazil has ended up in an unexpected situation:
while its regional leadership has grown on paper, in practice it has met
growing resistance. Yet the country has gained increasing global recog-
nition. Today, Brazil is acknowledged as an emergent global player by
the established world powers, such as the G-8 members and the Euro-
pean Union. This article has analyzed the mounting mismatch between
the regional and global recognition of Brazilian status. Due to lasting
cleavages, divergent interests, and power rivalries in South America, the
mismatch is not likely to be bridged anytime soon.
Paradoxically, however, if the Brazilian quest for regional leadership
has been unsuccessful, promoting it has been beneficial for Brazil’s
national interests. This paradox has lately come to the attention of the
country’s foreign policy elite, which is increasingly advocating a more
pragmatic stance based on diversified strategies to minimize depend-
ence on a troublesome region (CEBRI-CINDES 2007). Although subre-
gional integration has not ceased to be a goal, it is no longer a priority
(Vigevani et al. 2008). Furthermore, the increasing pluralization of actors
with a stake in foreign policy (Cason and Power 2009) may also be
making Brazil more globally—as opposed to regionally—sensitive.
The Brazilian bid for leadership has been hindered by several fac-
tors, which can be understood in light of the concepts presented in the
first section of this article. The structural components of its leadership
project (i.e., military power and economic might) have been insufficient
to cajole or buy support, especially facing rivals such as Venezuela, the
United States, and even Taiwan, which are willing to give money or mil-
itary support to win over undecided followers. The instrumental com-
ponents of leadership have been either unavailable or insufficient. Brazil
is reluctant to build common institutions because it feels they would tie
it to unreliable neighbors rather than consolidate regional integration. In
terms of ideas and values, its regional strategies look to some neighbors
like hegemonic incursions rather than enlightened leadership based on
the pursuit of shared interests. And regarding higher education and
migrant destinations, the main attractors for most South American coun-
tries continue to be extraregional powers; namely, the United States and
Europe.
To be sure, Brazil has not become indifferent to the region. However,
its ambitions are increasingly defensive rather than offensive. The main
goal is no longer to integrate South America into a regional bloc with a
single voice but to limit damages that could spill over its borders or stain
its international image as regional pacifier. Now, it seems sufficient to sta-
bilize the region and prevent political instability, economic turmoil, and
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border conflicts. The name of the game is to keep quiet rather than lead
the neighborhood, since preventing trouble in its backyard seems to be a
necessary condition for Brazil to consolidate its global gains. 
Given that Brazil is not a revisionist power that intends to upset the
system but rather a reformist one that wishes to enter it, damage control
has become its central task. This has turned a would-be leader into a fire-
man or, as Carlos Quenan once paraphrased from economics jargon, a
leader of last resort. Thus, as The Economist (2008b) aptly remarked, “it
may be the rising power in the Americas but Brazil is finding that diplo-
matic ambition can prompt resentment.” By trying to mitigate this resent-
ment, the country may find itself closer to the category of a traditional
rather than an emerging middle power. In other words, it can aspire to
a leading role on the global stage as long as it goes it alone.
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1. The American sociologist William Isaac Thomas in 1928 postulated that
“if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”
2. Brazil’s performance and emergence as a global power has been
acclaimed by top specialized media sources. See Economist 2008a; Newsweek
2008;Wall Street Journal 2008, 2009.
3. In 2005, Brazil’s military budget doubled Colombia’s, tripled Chile’s,
quadrupled Mexico’s, and was eight and ten times higher than Argentina’s and
Venezuela’s, respectively (IISS 2006). In 2007, it exceeded all its South American
counterparts combined (CEUNM 2008).
4. In 2006, oil made up 89 percent of Venezuela’s total exports and 56 per-
cent of its fiscal revenues (Alvarez 2007, 269).
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